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,ADDRESS OF JUSTICE ~s~ W ~ CAR'J."ER_Qllf~_SUPREME COURT OF CALI_-
~
The subject o£ my address this evening suggests
desirability ot a change in the trend of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Cal1rorn1a. I am sure that those of you t1ho
are familiar with the recent decisions or that court have no
doubt an to ~ views with respect to some of those decielonso
Wlule I do not venture to suggest the reason tor this trend, I
have a -reeling that. it may be said to be the product of' imperfect,
uncertain and m1.s1f;.ading tradl tion.
There can be l1ttla doubt that the philosophy of lawyers,
and particularly ot judges, is hamstrung and resti,.icted by
tradition, and that the anomalies and inequities v~hich exist
in our law today, are due largel,. to the inability of those who
chart the course of our judicIal system to throw oft and
discard traditional concepts ~hich are entirely out of harmony
with modern institutions and our present day way of lite. It
has been said that: 11 The tradition ot all past generations
Ifeighs like an Alp upon th\! b?aln ot all living .11 Since
tur-n or the cent~vaat-change~bave-been-made-,"nO-t on1yin-
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our social structure, but in the law with respect to the rights
or those Buttering injuries in our industries and in the
mechanized transportation facilities which have developed 80
rapidl7 in recent years. Many of U8 here tonight, have in our
own lifetime, observed a transition which has almost entirely
removed trom the jurisdiction of our courts, cases arising out
or industrial accidents and placed them under the jurisdiction
ot Commi8sions, many ot which are presided over by laymen,
which have power to award compensation in accordance with a
formula provided by statute. I think it must now be conceded
tha t the primary reason ror this change was to overcome the
eftect ot the archaic and unjust rules ot the common law which
barred reeovery tor injury or death to an employee whleh resulted
trom his contributory negligence, the negligence or his fellow
servant or the &a8umption of the risk of his emplO7ment 0
It is now recognized that these rules were 80 unjust
to the employee that a 8ocial problem arose which created the
necessity ror the enactment or workmen's compensation laws which
now exist in every state in the union. Our federal government
has kept pace with the states by enacting similar legislation
in the Federal EmployerB Liability Act and the Jones Act, both
of which acta entirely abrogate the derenses of negligence of a
fellow servant and assumption of risk and mod~rr the cont~ibuto~
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negligence rule to o~~ or comparative negligence which affects 
the amount ot reco'very in degree only. In the l:tght ot what 
haa transpired in the last three decades, I am confident 
scarcely anrone, even the most reactionary minds, would publicly 
advocate a reversion to the common law rules relating to 
industrial injuries, but it must be remembered that in practically 
every instance, these ru1e:!s were changed by legIa1a tion and not 
by court decisions 
Another archaic doctrine ot the common law which is 
still revered by our Judiciary, where it has not been abrogated 
by statute, i8 that ot the abatement ot tort liability as 
result ot the death ot the tort teasor. While this doctrine has 
been abrogated in some states, including CalIfornia by statute 
in 1949, it still exists in many states throughout the Union 
Under this doctrine, a man worth $20,000,000, could drive an 
automobile, while intoxicated, down a cro'tfded 3tzaet" kill 10 
persons and injure 20 morc, halt ot whom. were children" maimed 
and distigured tor lite, and it he were killed or died betore 
judgment could be recovered in a.n action aga1.nat him, none ot 
these injured persons, or the dependents ot those who were 
killed, could recover one cent against his estate. The Supreme 
Court of California Bustatned this doctrine for almost 100 years, 
and it required an act ot the Legislature to abrogate it. 
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All of you have undoubtedly had experien~e with the 
stand,a.re ot care exercised by the "reasonable man" -- another 
obsolete relic ot the common law. The best definition ot the 
reasonable man I have tound 1s in the decision ot Fardell v. 
Potts published in a little book called "Misleading Ca.ses ot 
the Common Law" by A. P. Herbert 0 Mr 0 Herbert says that the 
reasonable man is one who invariably looles where he i3 going, 
and is careful to examine the immediate foreground before he 
executes a leap or a bound; who neither star-gazes nor is lost 
in meditation when approaching trapdoors or the marg1n ot a 
dock; who'records in every case upon the backs ot checks such 
ample details as are desirable, scrupulously substitutes the 
word "Order" for the word "Bearer", crosses the instrument with 
the words "on account ot Payee Only" and registers the package 
in which it is sent; who never mOttnts a mov1ng streetcar and 
does not alight from any vehicle while it i8 in motion; who 
investigates exhaustively the BONA FIDES of every beggar before 
distrIbut1ng alms, and informs himself of the history and habits 
ot a dog before petting it; who believes no gOSSip, nor repeats 
it, without firm basis tor believing 1t to be tm1.8j who never 
drivea his ball until those 1n front of him have definitely 
vacated the putting green which is his own objective; who never 
from ,:me yearts end to another mal-:ea an exceS8ive demand upon 
his wIfe, or neighbors or hie servants; who, in the way ot 
business looks only for that narrow marg1n ot profit whic~l tvelYe 
-4,-
men such &s himself would reckon to be r&ir, and who contemplates
hi. fellow merchants,
their 
agents and their goode, with that
degree ot 8uspicion and di8 true t Which the law deems admirable;
who never a.ears, gambles, or loses hi. te~r; who uses nothing
except In moderatIon, and even whIle he 8pank~ h18 child 18
med1 tat1ng only on the golden rule. Mr. Herbert saY8 that this
excellent but odioU8 character 8tand. like a monument in our
Court. 
or Justice vainly appealing to his rellow citizens to
order their lives after his own example. Whether the case ot
Pardell v. Pott8, a8 reported by Mr. Herbert i8 fiction or
reall t'7, I am not sure --I am sure, however, tha t there 18 a
certain amount or truth to be round there. In that case Lord
Justice Morrow i8 supposed to have sa1d that the rea8onable man
i8 80 rare that he might be called a myth, and must be hatef'ul to
his fellow citizens, but it was odd that when twelve good men
and true were gathered together in a J~ box, they were easily
persuaded that they themselves were, each and generally, such
reasonable men without stopping to consider how strange a chance
it mu8t have been that had picked, so fortuitously, rrom a
whole people twelve examples ot so rare a species. The ladies
present may not enjo7 the ultimate holding in the case wherein
it was decided that there was no such thing &8 a REASONABLE
WOMAN, and that the learned trial judge should have directed
the --jUI-7- that, "h-11. t-here- was -evldenc-e on whlc-h the)" might-- -t-lnd
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that the detendant, Mrs. Pardell, had not come up to the 
standard required or a reasonable man, her conduct was only 
what was to be expected ot a woman, as suoh, and therefore, 
reversed the judgment. 
It juries assume that they possess the admIrable, 
impossible characteristics ot the reasonable man, the learned 
members ot our courts otten do the same thing when they tollow 
blindly the outmoded concept. ot early case. and construe 
statute. 11terally without regard tor common sense or the 
changing world 
During thi8 past week, I am sure that many very able 
gentlemen have addressed this convention, and have given you 
the benetlt of their experience and study in the field of 
compensation law. I do not intend to try to duplicate their 
efforts. I do want to glve you my ideas on what I consider to 
be "needed legislation" in this state, end. the reasons 1fhJ' that 
legislation would be beneficial to you, as attorney., to the 
courts, and to the people ot this state. 
The first and most lmportant matter ot correctlve 
legislation which I would suggest, arises as the re8ult ot 
the recent deciSion ot the Supreme Court ot California in the 
case ot Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Company (36 A.C. 775). 
In that case themajorlty ot ~ court held tl~t incurable 
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misconduct, amountIng to reversible error, was committed by 
counsel for plaintiff by moving in the presence of the jury to 
amend the prayer of the complaint for the purpose ot increasing 
the amount ot damages prayed tor, even though the order granting 
leave to amend was made out ot the presence of and never called 
to the attention of the jury. Such a holding makes ot the law 
"a ass, a idiot" as Mro Bumble remarked in Dickena' Oliver 
Twist. 
Because ot the implications 1n the majority opinion in 
the Sanguinetti case that a lawyer who moves to amend a pleading 
in the presence ot the jury is guilty ot incurable misconduct, 
and that. the allowance ot such amendment, whether in or out ot 
the presence of the jury, const1tutes revers1ble error, I teel 
constra1ned to emphasize the importance ot this case to all 
trial lawYers and judges tor the dual purpose ot vindioating 
trial lawyers who have engaged in 8uch practice and to ~rn 
both lawyers and judges ot the lamentable pitfall created by 
the decision ot the majority ot my court in the above mentioned 
case-o 
It appears trom the record in the Sanguinetti case that 
at the close of plaintiff's case, and while the jury was present, 
counsel moved to amend the prayer ot the complaint by increasing 
the praye-r-tor-dama-ge-a- trom- $-50,000 to-$15,OOO. The-r--e-up0lt, 
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counael tor derendnnt assigned 3ueh request as misconduct and 
moved ror a mistrial. The trial court did not then rule on 
motion to amend, but excused the Jury and heard arguments on 
the motion out ot the presence ot the jury. The ~otion was 
later granted by a minute order which was not called to the 
attention ot the jur.J, and the only way that the jury were 
advised that the motion was later granted was five days later, 
when the court instructed the jury that it could not return a 
verdict in exceS8 of $75,000 , the amount demanded in the 
complaint 0 No request was made by counsel tor defendant to 
instruct the jury to disregard the statement made by counsel tor 
the plaintirf when he made the Inotion to amend, and neither was 
the court asked to instruct the jur.J relative to the purpose ot 
the motion to amend or that they should not consider said motion 
as evidence that plaintiff was l!ntitled to the increased amount 
ot damages prayed tore 
At the conclusion ot thlt case, the jury were instructed 
tully as to the measure ot damages 1n personal injury case., 
advised that the amount of damai;es to which plaintiff was 
entitled was solely w1thin thei.t- discretion and that the court 
did not intend to :intimate that 1t was ita opinion that 
plaintiff was or was not entitL~d to damages and that any 
dama~e8a~l'ded l!1\l~.t_pj!_ ~Et~II~~'Ql~!-
-8-
The jury returned a verdict in lavor ot plaintitf 
$75,000, which wae attirmed by a unanimous deois10n ot the 
District Court ot Appeal but reversed by a bare major1ty ot the 
Supreme Court on the sole ground ot misconduct 1n mak1ng the 
mot10n to amend. ~~e major1ty op1n1on apparently concedds that 
the mot10n m1ght pl·operly have been made out ot the pres(!nce 
ot the Jury -- that the tr1al court would later 1ntorm the Jury 
that 1t could not return a verdIct 1n excess ot the increased 
amount prayed tor. Jurors are not toola and 1t tollows 'that 
they must then be aware that the compla1nt had been amended by 
increaaing the amount of damages cla1med. The major1ty op1nion 
in this case ia so out ot harmony with present day concepts o~ 
trial procedure that it reaembles some ot the skeletons of the 
dead past when conservative minded judges found such techn1cal 
and tinespun reasona tor reversing judgments based on jury 
verdicts that the people ot this state were constrained to adopt 
section 4-1/2 ot A~ticle VI ot our Constitution, imposing upon 
appellate courts the requirement ot determining that any error 
committed by a trial court must have resulted in a miscarriage 
ot just1ce betore reversing a jlldgment based on a jury verdict. 
The liberal concept ot this con~t1tutional provision apparently 
escaped the majority ot the court as it does not suggest 
a miscarr1age ot justiee re8ultt~ from the error tor which 1t 
l'"ever-aed the .. judgment .. 
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As I polnted out In m7 dlssent In the Sangulnettl case, 
the practlce or permittlng such amendments had prevalled durlng 
the 26 years I practiced before the courts ot this state and 
has contlnued since I have been on the Bench. Slnce the oplnlon 
in thls case bas been handed dOlfn, that practice now conatltutes 
reverslble error. If the majority or my court are to be 
consistent, they would also be required to hold that a motion 
to amend the answer, made In the presence ot the Jury, tor the 
purpose or pleadlng a detense, is reversible error. Either 
holdlng Is, ot course, absolutely absurd because It is imperative 
that the jury be Intormed as to the contents of both the complalnt 
and answer at all atages ot the proceeding. Therefore, legis-
lation to this end i8 desirable in order to overcome the effeet 
of this ridiculous holding which shocks both the intelligence 
as well as the sense of justice ot those who have read ito 
Legislation ia also suggested to correct the reg~ettable 
situatlon arising out ot the decision or the Supreme Court ot 
Callfornia In the case ot Zaragoa& v. Craven, 33 Cal02d 315, 
wherein the husband'. contrlbutory negllgence was imputed to 
injured Wife, and ahe was precluded ~rom any recovery tor 
injurles because the recovel~ would have been community 
property. In this state, as many ot you are only too well aware, 
the wite 18 given a cauae of action tor her personal inJl1riea 
(Code or Civil proeedure~O) and yet her recovery, it any, 
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becomes communit7 prope~ty of which her husband has control and 
management. The atringenc7 or the situation would be Bome.hat 
alleviated under a comparatIve negligence statute but that would 
entIrely obvIate thia particualr dittlcult7. It appears to 
me that legislatIon should be exacted to provide that a 
recovery ror personal injurIes ot the wire should constitute 
her separate property. It should be clearly provIded that the 
contributory negligence o~ her husband may not be imputed to 
her when ahe is suing for her own personal injuries. Suppose 
a wite losea both legs or arms in an automobile accident which 
occurred when she ~s riding in a car driven by her husband 
which collided with that ot a third person who was clearl,-
neglIgent. Would not conSiderations ot natural Justice require 
aD7 recovery ot genet-al damages tor such inJurIes ,constitute 
her separate property? To hold that the entire recovery is 
communlt,- property subject to the control and management ot 
the husband is to ignore the realities of 11~e. Times have 
changed Since the wite was a pOB.eseion or mere chattel ot the 
husband; fUrther, the husband might dissipate the monies 
recleved, the parties might be divorced, or the husband might 
be taken by death. The wlte would then be laft with her earning 
power seriously impaired and no means with which to ca.re for 
herself. Denial ot all reoovery to an innoct,nt plaintiff' tor 
'1n-jur±ea inti ie ted- by!t ne-g1:tgent- wrongdoer,-mere ly-- becaU8-e-th~ 
plaintitt"'a negligent husband might also ahaj:te in the compensation, 
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1s not 1n accordance with my ideas ot justice and right. 
The malpractice cases present another obstacle. The 
alacrity with which members ot ~he medical protesslon rush to 
testify aga1nst the1r tel10w members is NOT a matter of which 
jud1cial notice may be taken Judlc1a1 notice COULD be taken 
ot the tact that a p1aint!ff may be den1ed his day in court by 
the fact that he cannot procure the expert test1mony which bas 
been held to be essent1a1 before his case can even go to the 
jury. In Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 A.C o 467, the major1ty ot the 
Supreme Court ot Calitornia held that.the trial court had not 
been guilty ot an abuse or discretlon in retusing to permit 
plalntiff's expert wltness to qua1lry as an expert. B7 the 
time-worn rule that the qua1itication of an expert 1iea within 
the discretion ot the trial court, and by the equally time-
worn, and I do not say time-honored rule, that an appellate 
court will not interfere therew1th in the absence of an abuse 
ot dIscretion, a p1alntitt 18 effect1vely den1ed h1. day in 
court 0 H1a case is not possible of proof without the testimony 
ot an expert w1tness s1nce the mattera 1n issue are usually 
within the knowledge of experts only, and a plaintift cannot 
produce, at a moment's notice, a panel ot experts whose 
quallficat10ns might meet the capricious standards set by the 
trial judge 0 In the Huftman case, the plaintiff's expert 
witness was Dro -Webb-otLas Angeles-wfio- i8- not- on11' -iii-able 
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physician and surgeon with year's ot experience .. but one who had 
been held qualified to testify in a previous case. (Valentin v. 
La Societe Francaise .. 16 Ca1.App.2d 1.) The ettect ot the 
majority holding in the Huftman case is to place in the hands ot 
a trial judge the power to prevent a plaintift in a malpractice 
case trom presenting any evidence on the issue that a detendant 
tailed to exercise the degree ot care and skill usually exercised 
by reputable physicians in the same community. So long as the 
qua11f1cation ot the expel~t witness lies within the sole 
discretion ot the trial Judge, and an appellate court wll1 not 
interfere In the absence ot a showing ot an abuse ot that 
dlscretion, this 8ituation will arise. I am ot the opinion 
that legislatlon ehou1d be enacted providing that in reviewing 
the rul1ng ot the trial court, 1n either pernlitting or retusing 
the qualification ot an expert witness" the appellate court is 
not bound by the abuse of discretion rule.. b,ut may revlew the 
rullng and determine as a matter ot law whether or not reversible 
error waa committed. 
Another oU'cmoded doctrine stoutly adhered to by the 
Californ1a courta is that o? sovereign immunity trom tort 
liability. This absurd doctrins stems from the old common law 
idea that the king could do no 'wrong. It needs no citation ot 
authority that both state and federal governments have entered 
into almost '!}very field of ende,avor in one way or another, and 
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that thet, a8 veIl a8 prlvate enterprise, should be held llable 
the wrong8 Infllcted upon those wlth whom they come in 
contact. It has been aptly sald: "It' we say wlth Mr. Justlce 
Holmes, 'Men must turn square corners when they deal w1th the 
Government', It Is hard to see why the goverrment should not 
be held fO a llke standard ot rectangular rectltude when 
dea11ng ,1th its cltizens~" (48 Harv.L.Rev. 1299.) 
1he general expression ot' the doctrlne ot' soverelgn 
Immunity l:i8 that the state may not be sued vlthout its consent. 
It 1s t~ that the governmental Immunity doctrlne ls being 
gradUall~ eaten away by exceptlons such as the proprletar.y 
capacity jru1e (People v. Superlor Court, 29 Cal.2d 754), and the 
doctrlne Ilot estoppel (Farrell v. County ot' Placer, 23 Cal.2d 
624), bU~1 under present day condltlons, there ls no 10g1cal 
reason w~ the government should not ccmpensate those Injured 
by the t9rt8 ot Its servants and agents. Just recently the 
Supreme cpurt ot' Callt'ornia denied a hearlng in the case ot' 
Latham Vol Santa Clara County HospItal (104 A.C. 413). In that 
case the plalntift' alleged t'acts which, it' taken as true, as 
must Ii be, showed that he had been InJured through the 
negligentl i conduct ot' the hospital employees. He also a11~ged 
that he was a regularly paying patient and that there were tour 
other hosplt~ls In the community charging the same rates as he 
~id--1n -t~ecolli~ty hospital: The trlal court 8ustained the 
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detendantta demurrer to plaint1ttta complaint without leave to
amend.
The D1str1.ct Court ot Appeal reviewed the California
caaea on governmental liability and concluded that by judicial
decision and the controlling statute,s (Weltare & In8titutions
Code I '203.5) the dermxrrer had been properly sustained because
the Legislature (presumably cognizant ot the court decisions) I
had not intended to allow county hospi tala to enter the propr1etaJ
field.
I was of the opinion that the demurrer should have been
overruled inasmuch as the complaint raised a question of tact --
whether or not the county was operating its hospital in a
proprietary capac1 ty, the~eby waiving ita immunity. The entire
doctrine i8 outmoded --the government, through ita employees
can do wrong and intlic t injurie8. New York has waived both ita
immunity from Buit and its immunit7 from liability and baa
expressly consented to ha~le its liability determ1.ned in accordance
with the same rules ot law as are applied in actions against
individual. or corporation.. 1'he federal government has a180
80 provided (Federal Tort Claims-Act, Tit. IV, Pub. L. 601, ch.753). 
But not Ca1irornia or ita municipalities, except in rare
insta ces.
Where California has given ita consent to be 8ued,
the claims statutes present, as some ot you undoubtedly know, a
mass of contusion. This appears to me to be a f1.eld where
corrective legislation 1s badly needed.
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While I feel that it is unfortunate that it is necessary 
to resort to legislatIon to overcome the efrect of Judicial 
decisions which could be corrected by the courts themselves, I 
see little hope or a depa~ture from the trend of the decisions 
at the Supreme Court of California in the tields which I have 
discussed, and therefore, it the ettect ot these decisions i8 
to be overcome, it must be done by 1egislation,and I trust 
that an ettort in this di~ection will be made by this 
organizatIon 
While I enviSioned an organization of this character 
when I was engaged in the practice of law, no effort was made 
to bring it into being at that time, and I want to commend and 
congratulate the members of the bar who had the vision and 
foreSight to bring this organization into being. I am sure It 
can be made a vital force 1n the advancement of the sCience of 
Jurisprudence and give aid to the institutions engaged in 
the administration ot justiceo With thi8 objective 1n mind 
I commend it to those members ot the legal protession who have 
seen tit to espouse the cause at those who have suttered 
disability as a result ot the negligence or wilful misconduct 
of otherso 
While the practice ot the law may be said to be on a 
cQmpetitlve_ bartaonahigher-- plane -than- -that ger..erally: 
encountered 1n the bu.8ine8s world, there are many matters ot 
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common interest to all lawyers which can only be discussed and 
fostered by organized groups who are interested in a common 
objective 0 It ia a matter ot eommon knowledge that those members 
ot the bar specializing in detenses ot negligence cases have a 
more or less cohesive organization and are quite articulate in 
sponsoring and opposing legislation which might affect their 
line of end~avor. So it 18 important to those interested in 
the claimant's sIde ot the case to take united action in 8upport 
ot legislation which has for its objective the advancement of 
the weltare of their present and prospective clienteleo With 
proper leadership and the zeal and enthusiasm which has been 
shown by those participating in this convention, I have l.1ttle 
doubt that this organization will be a potent torce in 
establishing the standards by which justice lDay be more equally 
administered so t~At the concept 80 dear to the heart ot the 
american lawyer ot "equal justlce under law" shall become a 
realityo 
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